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Abstract: In this paper, we study how the interactions between central bank transparency and 
fiscal  policy affect  macroeconomic  performance and  volatility, in  a  framework  where
productivity-enhancing public investment could improve future growth potential. We analyze the 
effects of central bank’s opacity (lack of transparency) according to the marginal effect of public 
investment by considering the Stackelberg equilibrium where the government is the first mover 
and  the  central  bank  the  follower.  We  show  that the  optimal  choice  of  tax  rate  and  public 
investment, when the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, eliminates the effects 
of  distortionary  taxation and  fully  counterbalance both  the  direct  and  the  fiscal-disciplining 
effects of opacity, on the level and variability of inflation and output gap. In the case where the 
public  investment  is  not  sufficiently  productivity-enhancing,  opacity  could  still  have  some 
disciplining effects as in the benchmark model, which ignores the effects of public investment.
Keywords:  Distortionary  taxes, output  distortions,  productivity-enhancing  public  investment,
central bank transparency (opacity), fiscal disciplining effect.
JEL classification numbers:  E52, E58, E62, E63, H21, H30.
________________________________________
a BETA, University of Strasbourg, 61, avenue de la Forêt Noire – 67085 Strasbourg Cedex – France; Tel (33) 03 68 
85 21 31; Fax (33) 03 68 85 20 71; e-mail : dai@unistra.fr.
b LEAP,  Department  of  Economics,  Aristotle  University  of  Thessaloniki,  Thessaloniki,  Greece  54124,  E-mail: 
msidiro@econ.auth.gr, Phone: (30) 23 10 99 87 10; and BETA, University of Strasbourg, 61, avenue de la Forêt 
Noire  – 67085  Strasbourg  Cedex  – France;  Tel  (33)  03  68  85  20  85 ;  Fax  (33)  03  68  85  20  71;  e-mail: 
sidiro@cournot.u-strasbg.fr.1
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, an increasing number of central banks have become more transparent 
about their objectives, procedures, rationales, models and data. This has stimulated an intensive 
ongoing research about the effects of central bank transparency.
1 Most economists agree that 
openness and communication with the public are crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
because they allow the private sector to improve expectations and hence to make better-informed 
decisions (Blinder, 1998). Counterexamples have been provided, with addition of distortions,
where information disclosure reduces the ability of central banks to strategically use their private 
information, and  therefore, greater  transparency  may  not  lead  to  welfare  improvement  (e.g., 
Sorensen (1991), Faust and Svensson (2001), Jensen (2002), Grüner (2002), Morris and Shin 
(2002)).
2
Typical models on monetary policy transparency usually consider two players, the monetary 
authority  and  the  private  sector.  Departing  from  this  approach,  several  authors  introduce 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  interactions.
In effect, according to the second best theory, the removal of one distortion may not 
always lead to a more efficient allocation when other distortions are present. 
3
1 Pioneered  by  Cukierman  and  Metzler  (1986),  transparency  issue  has  been  examined  both  theoretically  and 
empirically by Nolan and Schaling (1998), Faust and Svensson (2001), Chortareas et al. (2002), Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007), among others. See Geraats (2002) and Eijffinger and van der 
Cruijsen (2010) for a survey of the literature. 
In  a  framework  where  the  government  sets  a 
distortionary tax rate, it was shown that uncertainty (or opacity) about the “political” preference 
parameter of the central bank, i.e. the relative weight assigned to inflation and output gap targets, 
could reduce average inflation as well as inflation and output variability (Hughes Hallett and 
Viegi (2003), Ciccarone et al. (2007), Hefeker and Zimmer (2010)). Higher distortionary taxes 
2 See Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) for a short survey about these models including distortions. 
3 Some researchers study the relationship between central bank transparency and the institutional design (Walsh, 
2003; Hughes Hallett and Weymark, 2005; Hughes Hallett and Libich, 2006, 2009; Geraats, 2007).2
necessary  for  financing  higher  public  expenditures will  induce  lower  output  gap  and  higher 
unemployment. Thus, central bank increases the inflation rate and workers claim higher nominal 
wages.  In  terms  of  macroeconomic  volatility,  less  central  bank  political  transparency  has  a
disciplining effect on the fiscal authority, which could dominate the direct effect of opacity when 
the government cares less about the public expenditures, and the central bank is quite populist
whilst the initial degree of central bank opacity is sufficiently high.
4
However, the aforementioned studies do not distinguish the different components of public 
expenditures  by  separating  public  consumption  (e.g.  public  sector  wages  and  current  public 
spending  on  goods)  from  public  investment  (e.g.,  infrastructure,  health  and  education).  A
substantial  theoretical  and  empirical  research  has  been  directed  towards  identifying  the 
components of  public  expenditure that  have significant  effects  on  economic  growth (Barro 
(1990)). The introduction of both public capital (infrastructures) and public services (education) 
as inputs in the production of final goods, theoretical models suggested that public investment
generates higher growth in the long run through raising private sector productivity (e.g. Futagami 
et al. (1993), Cashin (1995), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Ghosh and Roy (2004), Hassler et 
al. (2007), Klein et al. (2008), Azzimonti et al. (2009)). In addition, empirical studies confirm the 
positive impact of public investment on productivity and output (e.g. Aschauer (1989), Morrison 
and Schwartz (1996), Pereira (2000), and Mittnik and Neuman (2001)).
Usually, the frameworks used in theoretical studies on public investment ignore the effects 
due  to  monetary  and  fiscal  interactions.  Cavalcanti  Ferreira  (1999)  examines  the  interaction 
between  public  investment  and  inflation  tax  and  has  found  that  the  distortionary  effect  of 
4 The term “political transparency” used here corresponds to the information disclosure about the weights assigned 
by the central bank to the output gap and inflation stabilisation. Five motives for central bank transparency (i.e. 
political  transparency,  economic  transparency,  procedural  transparency,  policy  transparency  and  operational 
transparency) are defined in Geraats (2002).3
inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. Ismihan and Ozkan 
(2004) consider the relationship between central bank independence and productivity-enhancing 
public investment, and argue that although central bank independence delivers lower inflation in 
the short term, it may reduce the scope for productivity-enhancing public investment and so harm 
future growth potential. Ismihan and Ozkan (2007) extend the previous model by taking into 
account the issues of public debt, and have found that, under alternative fiscal rules (balanced-
budget rule, capital borrowing rule), the contribution of public investment to future output plays a 
key role in determining its effects on macroeconomic performance.
The  distinction  between  public  consumption  and  public  investment  could  allow  us  to 
introduce in the literature of central bank transparency the effects of public investment on the 
aggregate supply. These effects could correct the distortionary effects of taxation and therefore 
interact  with  central  bank  transparency. For  this  purpose,  we  re-examine  in this  paper  the 
interaction between central bank political transparency and fiscal policies in a two-period model,
similar to Ismihan and Ozkan (2004), where the public investment is productivity-enhancing and 
could compensate, partially or totally, the distortions generated by the taxes on revenue. The aim 
of the paper is to investigate to what extent the disciplining effect of opacity could be generalized 
to a framework where the government has more than one policy instrument.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 presents the 
benchmark equilibrium where there is no productivity-enhancing public investment. Section 4 
examines how the inclusion of public investment affects the effects of opacity according to the 
marginal effect of public investment on the aggregate supply. The last section summarizes our
findings.4
2. The model
The two-period model of discretionary policy making is similar to the one presented by Ismihan 
and Ozkan (2004). To model the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment on the 
supply, we consider a representative competitive firm, which chooses labor to maximize profits 
by taking price (or inflation rate  t ! ), wages (hence expected inflation 
e
t ! ), and tax rate ( t " ) on 
the  total  revenue  of  the  firm  in  period  t as  given,  subject  to  a  production  technology  with 
productivity  enhanced  by  public  investment  in  the  previous period  (
i





t t t g x 1 # $ # # % & " ! ! , 2 , 1 % t ; (1)
where  t x (in log terms) represents the normalized output (or output gap). Equation (1) captures 
the effects of supply-side fiscal policies on the aggregate supply of output, with the effect of 
distortionary taxes being clearly distinguished from that of public investment.
5
The public expenditures are composed by public sector consumption ( 0 '
c
t g ) and investment 
( 0 (
i
t g ),  both  expressed  as  percentages of  the  output. The  public  investment  consists  of 
productivity-enhancing expenditures on infrastructure,  health,  education etc. However,  as  its
favorable consequences indirectly affect the consumers’ utility, this type of expenditure is not 
taken into account in the policy maker’s utility function. On the contrary, public consumption 
made  up  of  public  sector  wages,  current  public  spending  on  goods  and  other  government 
spending is assumed to yield immediate utility to the government. The fiscal authority’s loss 
function is
5 The !"#$"%&'() allows covering a whole range of structural reforms. In effect, ) could also represent non-wage costs 
associated with social security (or job protection legislation), the pressures caused by tax or wage competition on a 
regional basis or the more general effects of supply-side deregulation (Demertzis et al., 2004). 5
)
%


















G g g x L * ! * + , (2)
where  0 E is an operator of mathematical expectations,  G + the government’s discount factor, 1 *
and  2 * the weights assigned to the stabilization of inflation and public consumption respectively, 
while the output-gap stabilization is assigned a weight equal to unity. 
The government’s objectives are the stabilization of the inflation rate and the output gap 
around zero, and of the public consumption around its target 
c
t g . The government minimizes the 





t g g " % $ , with 2 , 1 % t . (3)
Equation (3) is a simple form of the budget constraint since public debt and seigniorage revenue
are  not  taken  into  account. Even  though 
i
t g enhances  the  productivity  in  the  future,  it  is 
implemented and financed in the current period.
The government delegates the conduct of the monetary policy to the central bank while it 















CB x L , ! , - + , 0 ' - , (4)
where  CB + is the central bank’s discount factor. The parameter - is the expected relative weight 
that the central bank assigns to the inflation target and it could be equal or different from  1 * . It is 
therefore  an  indicator of  central  bank conservatism  (larger  - values)  versus  liberalism  or 
populism. According to the literature, we assume that the central bank can fully neutralize the 
effects of policy shocks (including public spending) or exogenous demand shocks affecting the 
goods market through appropriate setting of its policy instrument ! .6
The weights assigned by the central bank to the inflation and output-gap targets are more or 
less predictable by the government and private sector, meaning that , is a stochastic variable.
The fact that , is associated to both inflation and output objectives is adopted for avoiding the 
arbitrary effects of central bank preference uncertainty on average monetary policy (Beetsma and 
Jensen,  2003). The  distribution  of  , is  characterized by 0 ) ( % . , ,
2 2) ( ) var( , / , , % . % and 
] , 1 [ - , # 0 . Variance 
2
, / represents the degree of opacity about central bank preferences. When 
0
2 % , / , the central bank is completely predictable and hence, completely transparent. As the 
random  variable  , is  taking values  in  a  compact  set  and  has  an  expectation equal  to  zero, 
Ciccarone et al., (2007) have proved that 
2
, / has an upper bound so that  ] , 0 [
2 - /, 0 .
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms inflation expectations, 
then, the government sets the tax rate and public investment, and finally the central bank chooses 
the inflation rate. The private sector composed of atomistic agents plays a Nash game against the 
central  bank.  The  government,  as  Stackelberg  leader,  plays  a  Stackelberg  game  against  the 
central bank. The game is solved by backward induction.
3. The benchmark equilibrium without public investment 
First,  we  consider  a benchmark  case  where  the  public  investment  has  no  supply-side  effect.
Therefore, it is optimal for the government to set its level at zero. This benchmark case is drawn 
directly from Hefeker and Zimmer (2010). It is different from Ciccarone et al. (2007) who also 
introduce distortions in the labor market through the wage determination by an all-encompassing 
monopoly union, as well as from Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) who consider a Nash game 
between the fiscal and monetary authorities, both concerned by distortionary taxes.7
Equations (1) and (3) are rewritten as:
t
e
t t t x " ! ! # # % , (5)
t
c
t g " % . (6)












Equations (5)-(7) allow us to express the output gap as:
-





) )( ( t
e
t
t x . (8)
The  government  has  only  one  instrument  to  choose  between the  tax  rate  and  public 
consumption due to the budget constraint (6). Setting its fiscal policy, the government cannot 
predict (7)-(8) with precision due to imperfect disclosure of information about the central bank 
preferences. Substituting 
c
t g , t ! and  t x given  by  (6)-(8),  the  government’s  constrained 
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the government’s loss function is rewritten as
)
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G g L " * " ! + . (10)
Proposition 1. For given expected inflation and tax rate, an increase in central bank’s opacity 
generally induces higher social welfare loss. 8
Proof. Deriving  (10) with  respect  to 
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0 ; $ t
e
t " ! . *
As the government has an objective of public consumption, t " cannot be fixed in a way to 
completely  neutralize  the  effects  of  central  bank’s  opacity  in the  social  loss  function.  If  the 
government sets 
e
t t ! " # % to neutralize the effects of opacity on the social loss function, it will 
suffer from high marginal cost due to insufficient public consumption. Hence, the optimal level
of  the  tax  rate  depends on  the  degree  of  opacity.  From  the  first-order  condition  of  the 
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From (13)-(17), we observe that the denominator increases as the degree of opacity
2
, / , while 
the numerator of (16) decreases as
2
, / and the numerator of (17) is increases as
2
, / . It follows 
that  t " ,
c
t g , t ! and  t x are all decreasing in 
2
, / . On the other hand, ) var( t ! and  ) var( t x could be 
both increasing or decreasing in 
2
, / , as shown by the results of Hefeker and Zimmer (2010) that 
we reformulate in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. An increase in central bank’s opacity reduces the tax rate, inflation and output 
distortions but increases deviations of public consumption from its target level. It reduces the 
variability of inflation and output gap if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high and vice 
versa. 




t g g # given by (13)-(16) with respect to 
2
, / , leads to the first 
part of Proposition 2. Deriving  ) var( t ! and  ) var( t x given by (17) with respect to 
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< and vice versa. *
Distortions introduced by taxes used to finance public expenditures imply higher current and 
expected inflation rates. Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle implies that the government is 
incited  to  adopt  a  less  aggressive  fiscal  policy  (“disciplining  effect”)  because the  perceived
marginal costs associated with higher taxes are higher under central bank opacity. This stance of 10
fiscal policy leads to lower output gap and inflation rate at the cost of larger deviation of public 
consumption from its target level. In terms of macroeconomic volatility, opacity triggers two 
opposing  effects. The  first  corresponds  to  the  direct  effect  of  opacity  on  the  variability  of 
inflation and output gap for a given tax rate (or given level of distortions). The second refers to 
the disciplining effect, since uncertainty about the central bank preference leads to greater fiscal 
discipline, contributing to the reduction of inflation and output volatility. The disciplining effect 
is more likely to dominate the direct effect of opacity if the central bank is less averse to inflation 
(smaller - )  and  the  government  is  less  concerned  with the  public  consumption deviations 
(smaller 2 * ). 
Using the property  ] , 0 [
2 - /, 0 , shown by Ciccarone et al. (2007), we extend the previous 
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the government assign a sufficiently high weight to the public consumption, i.e. 
) 1 (






* - - * *
$
$ # $ ' , the disciplining effect of central bank’s opacity will always be dominated by 
the direct effect of opacity on the variability of inflation and output gap and vice versa.
Proof. We  obtain  0 2 2
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- - * * -
, / $
$ $ $ ' = . According  to  Ciccarone  et  al.
(2007), there exists an upper bound on
2
, / so that  ] , 0 [
2 - /, 0 . Thus, the previous lower bound on
2
, / is  valid  only  when  - *
- - * * - < $
$ $ $
) 1 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1
2 ( .  This  leads  to 
) 1 (
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* - - * *
$
$ # $ ' , the only possible case is that we have always ) 1 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1
2 ( 2
*
- - * * -
, / $
$ $ $ < . In this 
case, the direct effect of opacity will always dominate the disciplining effect. *
In the following, we examine the validity of the previous results in the case where the public 
investment is productivity-enhancing.11
4. Effects of productivity-enhancing public investment  
Consider  that the public  investment  is  productivity-enhancing. However,  according  to  the 
marginal effect of such investment, the government might be incited to implement positive, zero 
or  even  negative  public  investment  in  period  1  or/and  2.  Even  though  negative  public 
investments, such as privatization of infrastructure and education institutions, are possible in 
practice, they cannot be captured in the present model. That is because such disinvestments are 
considered to generate a negative effect on the productivity while the privatization suggests a 
transfer of property but not an inversion of effects of such investments on the productivity. Thus,
we assume that negative public investments are not allowed. This implies that we must introduce 
two supplementary constraints for the government, i.e.  0 1 (
i g and  0 2 (
i g .
Minimizing the central bank’s loss function (4) subject to the economic constraint (1) yields 
the central bank’s reaction function:
-













g , with  2 , 1 % t . (18)
Using (1)-(3) and (18), we rewrite the government’s loss function as:
} ] ) ( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( {
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1
0
c i i e
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c i i e G g g g g g g L # # $ # $ 7 $ # # $ # $ 7 % " * & " ! + " * & " ! . (19)








t g & " ! , an increase in central bank’s
opacity induces a higher social welfare loss.
Proof. Deriving the loss function given in (19) with respect to 
2
, / and using the definition of 7 ,


























t g & " ! . *12
Opacity has negative effects on the social welfare. In the absence of productivity-enhancing 
public investment, the government has incentive to reduce the tax rate but at the risk of increasing 
the deviation of public consumption from its target level. In the case of productivity-enhancing 
public investment, when positive interior solutions exist for public investment in two periods, the 
effects of past public investment allow a complete compensation of the distortions introduced by 
the taxes. Thus, the government is enabled to set a tax rate to ensure that the objective of public 
consumption is realized. Since the distortions disappear, the central bank has no incentive to set 
an inflation rate higher than zero. In contrast, the distortions will only be partially compensated 
when such interior solutions do not exist. In the following we consider the case where positive 
interior solutions exist for public investment and two cases of corner solutions. 
4.1. The case where positive interior solutions exist for public investment
This is the case where the public investment is sufficiently productivity-enhancing, such that  
public investments are set optimally by the government at a strictly positive level in two periods. 
The first-order conditions of the minimization problem (19) are:
0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 2 0 1 1
1
% # # $ # $ 7 %
:
: c i i e
G
t g g g
L
" * & " !
"
, (20)
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Solving (20)-(23) gives the government’s reaction functions:13
i e g0 1 1 & ! " $ # % , (24)
i e c i g g g 0 1 1 1 & ! $ # # % , (25)
e e c i g g 1 2 1 0
2
2 &! ! & & " # # # % , (26)
e e c c i i g g g g 1 2 2 1 0
2
2 &! ! & & # # # # % . (27)
To determine the expected inflation rates, we substitute  1 " ,
i g1 and  2 " respectively, given by
(24)-(26) into (18). Imposing rational expectations yields:
0 2 1 % %
e e ! ! . (28)
Using the results given by (28) into (24)-(27) leads to the equilibrium solutions
i g0 1 & " % , (29)
c i i g g g 1 0 1 # %& , (30)
c i g g 1 0
2
2 & & " # % , (31)
c c i i g g g g 2 1 0
2
2 # # % & & . (32)
From (30) and (32), we deduce the minimal value of & for ensuring that the optimal public 
investment is strictly positive in two periods, as follows: 
i
c i c c
g








Under this condition, we have simultaneously  0 1 '
i g and  0 2 '
i g .




t g g % , with  2 , 1 % t . (33)14
Compared to the benchmark solution (13), the solutions of tax rate and public consumption given 
by (29), (31) and (33), are extremely simple. They depend only on the initial public investment, 
the marginal effect of public investment and the targets of public consumption. 
Proposition  5. If  the  public  investment  is  sufficiently  productivity-enhancing,  i.e. 
i
c i c c
g







' & , the government will optimally set the tax rate and public investment such as 
to  neutralize  the  effects  of  central  bank  preferences  and  hence  the effects of  opacity  on  its 
decisions. 
Proof. It follows straightforward from (29)-(33). *
We remark that the government’s decisions given by (29)-(33) are not dependent on central 
bank preferences. The central bank’s “type” (more or less conservative) has neither effect on the 
tax rate and public investment nor on their variability. Thus, the degree of transparency has no
impact  on  these  decisions. The  introduction  of  sufficiently  productivity-enhancing  public 
investment incites the government to increase the tax rate to finance higher investment in period 
1, but not necessarily in period 2. In effect, the government can collect more taxes, given the 
higher productivity in period 2. But, as the benefits of public investment in period 2 will be 
attributed to the next government, the government has no incentive to increase public investment 
in this period. However, the government is not urged to set the public investment in period 2 at 
zero, since the tax rate which neutralizes the distortions could generate more tax revenue than 
what is optimal to spend on the public consumption. The current government is elected on a 
mandate  which  implies  that  it should not  set  a  too  high  public  consumption  to  avoid  the 
deterioration of the social welfare.
We notice that the tax rate and public investment in the two periods do not depend on the 
preferences of fiscal authorities. In effect, when the government, whatever are the government 15
preferences, sets separately the tax rate and public investment, it must ensure that the optimal 
choices allow concealing the effects of these two policy instruments on production and hence 
inflation. 
Using the results given by (28)-(31) into (1) and (18), we obtain:
0 2 1 % %! ! , (34)
0 2 1 % % x x . (35)
The above equilibrium solutions show that inflation and output-gap targets of the central bank are 
always realized. 
Proposition  6. If  the  public  investment  is  sufficiently  productivity-enhancing,  i.e. 
i
c i c c
g







' & ,  the  optimal  choice  of  tax  rate  and  public  investment  by  the  government 
allows the neutralization  of the  effects  of  central  bank  preferences  and  hence  the  effects  of 
opacity on the level and variability of inflation and output gap.
Proof. It follows directly from the solutions given by (34)-(35). *
In contrast to the existing literature on the interaction between fiscal policies and central bank 
transparency,  the  degree  of  political  transparency  in  the  present  case  is  irrelevant  for  the 
economic equilibrium and macroeconomic stabilization. This is because the government, which 
has two free policy instruments, is able to conceal the distortionary effects of taxes collected to 
finance the public expenditures through the optimal choice of tax rate and public investment. 
Then, the central bank has no motivation to set an inflation rate higher than the target inflation, 
which is zero. This is rationally expected by the wage setters, thus leading to the elimination of
the output distortions.16
Our findings imply that the government could generally neutralize the effects of opacity when 
positive  interior  solutions  exist  for  tax  rates  and  public  investments.  There  is  neither  a  case 
against, nor a case for more opacity of the central bank. Meanwhile, in contrast to the benchmark 
case, the central bank has no incentive to be more opaque since the disciplining effects of opacity 
have disappeared.
4.2. The cases of corner solutions for public investment
We  now  consider two  cases of  corner  solutions.  In  the  first  case,  the  public  investment  is 
insufficiently  productivity-enhancing  such  that  the  constraints  0 1 (
i g and  0 2 (
i g are  both 
binding.  In  the  second  case,  it  is  quite  productivity-enhancing  such  that  only  the  second 
constraint is binding.
Case 1. Public investments are set to zero in two periods





1 < & (or  0 1 0 < #
c i g g & ), i.e. the marginal effect of the past investment 
on the current productivity is smaller than the ratio of public consumption target in period 1 over 
public  investment in  period  0. Because  the  condition  0 1 0 < #
c i g g & implies  that 
0 0 1 1 < $ # %
i c i g g g & and  0 2 1 2 1 0
2
2 < # % # # %
c i c c i i g g g g g g & & & , the interior solutions of 
i g1 and 
i g2 are  both  negative.  Taking  into  account  the  constraints 0 , 2 1 (
i i g g , the  government sets
0 2 1 % %


















L , i.e. a decrease in 
i g1 and 
i g2 will improve the 
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Using (1), (3), (18), (38)-(41), 0 2 1 % %
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The equilibrium solutions given by (40)-(45) allow us to examine how the economy will behave 
under central bank opacity when the public investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing.18






1 < & , the public investments in the two periods are set to zero. Compared to the benchmark 
case, the tax rate and public consumption are higher and the inflation rate and output distortions 
lower in period 1, and their equilibrium values are the same in period 2.  
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from comparing (40)-(45) with (13)-(16). *
In the present case, even though the government has no incentive to implement a positive 
public investment in periods 1 and 2, the effects of public investment in period 0 allow the 
government  to  increase  the  tax  rate  and  public  consumption  in  period  1  while  reducing 
distortions. Therefore, the inflation rate and output distortions are both lower in period 1. In 
period 2, as the effects of past investment disappear, the government will behave exactly like in 
the benchmark case.
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< . The inflation rate and output distortions in 
period 1 are negatively affected by an increase in opacity independently of & . In period 2, all 
these variables are negatively related to the degree of opacity independently of & .
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from deriving (40)-(45) with respect to 
2
, / . *
The productivity-enhancing effect of public investment in period 0 enables the government to 
increase the tax rate and hence public consumption in period 1. Thus, the disciplining effect of 
opacity in the tax rate and the effect of public investment allow reducing the inflation rate and 19
output distortions. In period 2, since the effect of past public investment disappears, all these 
variables will behave as in the benchmark case.
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We notice that (47) is the same than (17).






1 < & , an increase in opacity has similar but smaller effects on the variability of inflation and 
output gap in period 1, and identical effects in period 2 compared to the benchmark case.
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$ # $ ' , the only possible case is that these derivatives are positive 
due to the upper bound on the initial degree of opacity, i.e.  - /, ?
2 . *
These results are explained by the fact that the past investment weakens the distortionary 
effects of the taxes in period 1 without modifying the mechanism through which the effects of 
opacity are transmitted to the economy. The disciplining effect of opacity dominates the direct 20
effect of opacity on macroeconomic volatility only if the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently 
high and the weight assigned by the government to the public consumption sufficiently low. The 
conditions imposed on these parameters are exactly the same as in the benchmark case.   
Case 2. Public investment is set to zero only in period 2
This corresponds to the case where the marginal effect of public investment on the productivity is   
at  an  intermediate  level  such  that  i
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< <& .  This is  equivalent  to  have 
simultaneously  0 1 0 ' #
c i g g & and  0 2 1 0
2 < # #
c c i g g g & & .  Thus,  the  interior  solution  of  public 
investment in period 1 is positive, i.e.  0 1 0 1 ' # %
c i i g g g & and that in period 2 is negative, i.e. 
0 2 1 2 1 0
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L , i.e. a decrease in 
i g2
under zero will improve the social welfare. Using  0 2 %
i g and the first-order conditions (20)-(22),
we obtain:
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Substituting  1 " ,
i g1 and  2 " respectively given by (48)-(50) into (18), we obtain:
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Since  0 2 1 0
2 < # #
c c i g g g & & , we have 0 , 2 1 '
e e ! ! .
Substituting the above solutions of  
e
1 ! and 
e
2 ! into (48)-(50) yields: 
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Using (3), (53)-(54) and  0 2 %
i g , the public consumption in periods 1 and 2 is:
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Finally, using (1), (18), (51)-(53) and (55), we get the inflation rate and output gap in periods
1 and 2:
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In  the  following,  we  compare  the  equilibrium  solutions  given  by  (53)-(61)  with  these 
obtained in the first case of the corner solutions (40)-(45)  and with the benchmark solutions (13)-
(15). Furthermore, we compare the macroeconomic volatility obtained in the present case with 
these observed in the benchmark solution (17) and in the first case of the corner solutions (46)-
(47). 
Proposition 9a. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
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4 ) ( $ $
< <& , the optimal level of public investment is positive in period 1 and zero
in period 2. Compared to the benchmark case, the tax rate and public consumption are higher in 
two  periods,  the  inflation  rate  and  output  distortions are  lower (higher) in  period  1  if 
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1 & & + $ ' ) while they are always lower in period 2. 
Proof. See Appendix A, part I.  *
In the second case of the corner solutions, a positive public investment is implemented in 
period 1 but not in period 2. Compared to the benchmark case, the government can increase the 
tax rate and public consumption in periods 1 and 2 while reducing distortions due  to the effects 
of public investment in periods 0 and 1. Therefore, the inflation rate and output distortions are 
both lower in period 1 if the public consumption target of period 2 is not too higher. In effect, if 
the latter is too high, the intertemporal trade-off will incite the government to increase the tax rate 
in  the  way  that  it  can  invest  more  in  period  1,  leading  to  higher  inflation  rate  and  output 23
distortions in this period. In period 2, as the public investment in period 1 has a positive effect on 
the production in period 2, the government reduces output distortions and this incites the central 
bank to reduce the inflation rate.





1 < & , the tax rate is higher in two periods. The 
public consumption is higher, and the inflation rate and output distortions lower in period 1 only 
if the target of public consumption in period 2 is not too high. The public consumption is higher,
and the inflation rate and output distortions lower in the period 2. 
Proof. See Appendix A, part II. *
The second case of the corner solutions is intermediate between the first case (where the 
government does not invest in periods 1 and 2) and the case of the interior solutions (where the 
government has incentive to invest in both periods). The productivity-enhancing effect of past 
investment urges the government to increase the public consumption in period 1, but this effect 
could  be  dominated  by  the effect  of  intertemporal  trade-off.  More  precisely,  if  the  public 
consumption target of period 2 is too high, the government will lower the public consumption in 
period 1 to implement a higher level of public investment allowing it to recover more fiscal 
revenue in the period 2.
Proposition 10a. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
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< <& such that the public investment is set to zero only in period 2, the 
public investment in period 1 is not affected by central bank opacity, while the tax rate, public 
consumption, inflation rate and output distortions in two periods are negatively affected by an 
increase in opacity.24
Proof.  It  follows  straightforwardly  from  deriving  (53)-(61) with  respect  to 
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In the second case of the corner solutions, as in the benchmark case, the disciplining effect of 
opacity on the tax rate allows the reduction of the output distortions and hence of the inflation 
rate.  However,  public  investments  are independent  of  central  bank  preferences  and  hence  of 
central bank opacity. This is because the public investment allows the reduction of the output 
distortions, and the government has to trade-off between its current consumption and current 
investment, something that affects the future public consumption. Therefore, the choice of public 
investment depends only on the parameter representing the marginal effect of public investment,
on the supply function and the parameters characterizing the government preferences.
Proposition 10b. If the public investment is relatively productivity-enhancing in the sense that 
i
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< <& , an increase in opacity has similar but smaller effects on the variability 
of inflation and output gap in period 1 (except when the public consumption target in period 2 is 
too high, i.e. 






1 & & + $ ' ) and identical effects in period 2, compared to the benchmark. 
Proof. See Appendix B. *
As discussed above, the public investments in periods 0 and 1 attenuate the distortionary 
effects of the taxes in periods 1 and 2 but do not modify the mechanism through which the effects 
of opacity are transmitted to the economy. As in the benchmark case, an increase in opacity could 
reduce the macroeconomic volatility only when the direct effect of opacity is dominated by the
fiscal disciplining effect of opacity. This is possible only when the initial degree of opacity is 
sufficiently  high  and  the  weight  assigned  by  the  government  to  the  public  consumption 25
sufficiently  low,  with  the  conditions  imposed  on  these  parameters  being the  same as in  the 
benchmark case.
Our findings suggest that when the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, the 
government will have another free policy instrument that can be used efficiently to neutralize the 
distortionary effects of taxes necessary for financing public expenditures. In this case, central 
bank opacity has no effect on the macroeconomic performance and volatility. However, as shown
by the corner solutions, when the public investment is not sufficiently productivity-enhancing, 
the government cannot use it to completely counterbalance the distortionary effects of taxes. 
Therefore,  the  level  of  output  distortions  and  the  effects  of  opacity  in the  macroeconomic 
performance and volatility will situate between these found in the benchmark case and these in 
the case where the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing. 
The  benchmark  case  suggests  that  an  increase  in  opacity  improves  the  macroeconomic 
performance by reducing the tax rate, and hence the inflation rate and output distortions through 
the fiscal disciplining effect. It could reduce the macroeconomic volatility when the direct effect 
of opacity is dominated by the fiscal disciplining effect, i.e. if the initial degree of opacity is 
sufficiently high and the weight assigned by the government to the target of public consumption 
low enough. Under these conditions, there is clearly a case for central bank opacity. If the weight 
assigned by the government to the target of public consumption is high enough, then there is a 
trade-off between macroeconomic  performance and volatility, because an increase in opacity 
induces lower inflation  rate  and  output  distortions  but  higher  macroeconomic  volatility.  The 
trade-off is  cancelled  if  the  public  investment  is  highly  productivity-enhancing, since the 
government could neutralize the distortionary effects of the taxes. However, when the public 
investment is insufficiently productivity-enhancing, the implications of the benchmark case are 
still valid even though the effects of opacity on the macroeconomic performance and volatility 26
could be weakened by the productivity-enhancing effects of public investment in the past and/or 
in period 1.
Our  previous  results  are  obtained by  assuming  a Stackelberg game,  a budget  constraint
excluding debt-financing and a particular timing sequence concerning the effect of productivity-
enhancing  public  investment.  A  robust  check  of  our  results  would  need  to  consider the 
implications of alternative assumptions about these points. In the following, without giving full 
algebraic  developments,  we  just  provide some  intuitions about how  our  findings  could  be 
affected if these alternative assumptions are adopted.
Regarding the timing of the fiscal policy innovations, it is to notice that in equation (1) which 
models the link between fiscal aggregates and the  output  gap, distortionary taxes enter  such 
equation  contemporaneously,  i.e.  an  immediate  impact  on  the  business  cycle  is  allowed.  In 
contrast,  fiscal  expenditures  through  productivity-enhancing  public  investment  exert  their 
positive  impact  on  the  business  cycle  with  a  one-period  lag.  Such  time  discrepancy  can  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that the  achievement  of  such  investment  may  take  a  delay  and the 
government pays the contractors of public investment before its achievement under a fiscal rule 
which asks each government to use current fiscal revenue to finance current public investment 
even though the later has positive effect on next period revenue. 
However, one might think of fiscal expenditures planned and implemented in advance on the 
basis of an expected amount of revenues collected later on. Under this interpretation, it would call 
for the debt-financing of public investment in order to share the burden of its cost over time,
leading to the presence of real public debt in the economy. Therefore, one possible extension of 
the present model is to consider, following Ismihan and Ozkan (2007), a government budget 
constraint which creates the link between the fiscal and monetary policies:27
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where k is the real holdings of base money as share of output, 1 # t d denotes the amount of single-
period indexed public debt issued (as a ratio of output) in period  1 # t and to be re-paid in period 
t, 1 # t r represents the rate of interest at which it is borrowed,  t d is the new debt issue in period t.
Such an extension implies that we have to modify the budget constraint in the benchmark case to 
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Taking into account of public debt or/and seigniorage revenue complicate considerably the 
algebraic  analysis.  Consider  first  the  benchmark  Stackelberg  equilibrium  with  the  budget 
constraint  (66). The  seigeneuriage  revenue  is  an  alternative  source  of  financing  which  can
substitute the tax revenues since, for a given public expenditures, a higher seigeneuriage revenue 
will allow the government to reduce the distortionary tax rate. Therefore, the central bank has 
incentive to let inflation rate be higher in order to reduce the distortions induced by distortionary 
taxes.  On  the  other  hand,  by  increasing  the  tax  rate,  the  government  could  induce  a  higher 
inflation in order to boost total fiscal revenue. In this framework, the inclusion of seigneuriage 
revenue could decrease the disciplining effect of central bank opacity. The final effects of central 
bank opacity will be ambiguous and depend on the structural parameters of the model.
In the case where the policymaker has access to borrowing from the public in order to finance 
public investment, it has two supplementary (intertemporal) instruments at its disposal, public 
investment and public debt. The first can be utilized to improve future output prospects and the 
second to spread the cost of financing public spending over time. In effect, the fiscal authority’s 
optimization  now  requires  balancing  the  intertemporal  consequences  of  both 
i g1 and  1 d in 28
addition to equalizing the marginal welfare losses from different sources of taxation ( t ! and  t " ).
In opposite to an increase in public investment, a rise in the first period’s public borrowing has a 
favourable effect on macroeconomic performance (higher inflation rate, output gap and current 
spending gap) but an unfavourable effect on the second period’s one. In effect, the presence of 
sufficiently  productivity-enhancing public  investment  opportunities,  i.e.  when  & is  higher 
enough, enables the policymaker to finance popularity-enhancing public consumption in both 
periods with the help of intertemporal instruments (
i g1 and  1 d ) without hampering output and 
inflation performance (Ismihan and Ozkan, 2007). In this framework, central bank opacity will 
have negative effects on social welfare given the choice of public debt, public investment and tax 
rate.  As  we  have  argued  before,  since the  government  has  more  than  one  instrument at  its 
disposal,  it could  generally  neutralize  the  effect  of  central  bank  opacity  on  the  Stackelberg 
equilibrium if the public investment is sufficiently productivity-enhancing. In the other cases, the 
effects of central bank opacity will persist but will be less than at the benchmark equilibrium.
An alternative assumption about the timing of the fiscal policy innovations, i.e. the current 
public investment has productivity-enhancing effects on current supply, could justify better the 
nonexistence of  public  debt  in the  budget  constraint  given  by  equation  (3).  If government 
expenditures entered equation (1) contemporaneously, without giving the detailed algebra which 
will  be  quite  simple  to  do,  we  conjecture  that  the  general  results  of  the  model  will not  be 
significantly  modified.  There  will  not  be  any  intertemporal  but  just intratemporal  arbitrage 
between public investment, tax rate and public consumption. As the government will be able to 
neutralize  the  effects  of  distortions  induced  by  the  taxes when  the  public  investment  is 
sufficiently productivity-enhancing, the effects of central bank opacity which act through the 29
economic distortions induced by taxes will again disappear. In the other case, the effects of 
central bank opacity will be identical to these at the benchmark equilibrium.
Our main findings and previous discussions are based on the assumption that the government 
is the Stackelberg leader and the central bank the Stackelberg follower. This corresponds to the 
case where the government sets its fiscal policy once a year, say at the beginning of the period, 
and the central bank makes monetary policy decisions on numerous occasions during that year. 
However, it is possible that important policy decisions also occur contemporaneously. One would 
like to understand how the results would change if the assumption on the timing of the strategic 
game is modified by allowing the government and the central bank to move simultaneously in a 
Nash game. The basic difference in terms of results will appear in the benchmark model’s Nash 
equilibrium. Central bank opacity is likely to induce higher inflation expectations and hence 
higher inflation rate. The reason is that, in the Nash game, the government does not make any 
commitment as in the Stackelberg game. The central bank will doubt if opacity has any fiscal 
disciplining effects and will tend to consider that the fiscal authority will not restrain its public 
consumption and taxes. As a result, the fiscal authority will have incentive to restrict as less as 
possible its taxes and public consumption. At the equilibrium, the fiscal disciplining effect of 
central bank opacity would be present only if the government attributes a too high relative weight 
to the public consumption. The direct effect of central bank opacity will dominate the fiscal 
disciplining effect of opacity if the latter exists. Central bank opacity will always induce higher 
inflation  rate  and  lower  output  gap  in  the  presence  of  distortionary  taxes,  leading  to  higher 
inflation  and  output  volatility.  Whatever  is  the  fiscal  (un)disciplining  effect  in  the  Nash 
equilibrium, the  introduction  of  productivity-enhancing  public  investment  will  give  the 
government a supplementary policy instrument to fully neutralize the direct and indirect effects 
of central bank opacity if the marginal productivity of public investment is sufficiently high. In 30
the other cases, central bank opacity could still have undesirable effects on the macroeconomic 
performance.
5. Conclusion
In a two-period model where productivity-enhancing public investment could improve future 
growth potential, we have examined the interaction between central bank transparency and fiscal 
policy and the resulting effects on macroeconomic performance and volatility. In the framework 
of the Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the first mover and the central bank the 
follower, we have shown that the effects of central bank’s opacity (or lack of transparency) 
depend on the marginal effect of public investment.
In the benchmark case (without productivity-enhancing public investment), central bank’s
opacity reduces the inflation rate, tax rate, public consumption and output distortions when the 
direct  effect  of  opacity  is  dominated  by  the  fiscal disciplining  effect  of  opacity.  The  latter 
condition is verified when the weight assigned to the public consumption is low enough, the 
central  bank  is  quite  populist, and  the  initial  degree  of  opacity  is  high  enough. We  have 
demonstrated that the government’s optimal choice of tax rate and public investment, when the 
public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, eliminate the effects of distortionary taxation 
and fully counterbalance both the direct and the fiscal-disciplining effects of opacity at the level 
and variability of inflation and output gap.
However, in the intermediate cases, where the public investment is insufficiently or relatively 
productivity-enhancing,  the  effects  of  opacity  would  be  between  these  predicted  by  the
benchmark model. Even though the effects of opacity on the macroeconomic performance and 31
volatility  could  be  weakened by  the  productivity-enhancing  effects  of  public  investment,  the 
implications of the benchmark case, regarding the effects of opacity, will be valid again. 
Finally,  the  present  study  can  be  extended  into  different  directions by  considering,  for 
example, a Nash game structure, a budget constraint including seigneuriage revenue and public 
debt used to finance the public investment, and/or the contemporary effect of public investment.
Some  of  these  extensions  could  affect  significantly  the  benchmark  equilibrium and/or the 
transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policy in the full model. However, we conjecture 
that our findings concerning the neutralization of the effects of central bank opacity when the 
public  investment  is  sufficiently  productivity-enhancing are  robust  to  these  alternative 
assumptions.
Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 9a and 9b
Denote the solutions in the benchmark case with a super index “b”, the first corner solutions with 
a super index “fc” and the second-case corner solutions with a super index “sc”. The parameter  
& is  also  indexed  so  that we  have  in  the  first-case  of  corner  solutions 
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Part I: Second case of corner solutions versus the benchmark case
Comparing the second-case corner solutions (54)-(61) with the benchmark solutions (13)-(16),
and using the condition  i
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Part II: Second case of corner solutions versus the first case
Solutions (40)-(45) and (54)-(61) are indexed according to the aforementioned conventions.
Comparing them yields:
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positive due to the upper bound on the initial degree of opacity, i.e.  - /, ?
2 (see the proof of 
Proposition 3). 
The variance of inflation and the output gap in period 1, given by (63), is greater (smaller) 
than  the  one given  by  (17)  in the  benchmark  case  if 
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2 1 & & & & + $ < < # , respectively). The variance of inflation and the output gap in 
period 2, given by (64), is smaller than that given by (17).  *
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